In the 1950s, at the onset of the Cold War, Pakistan and Turkey
were part of the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO, a pro-Western bloc of
Muslim-majority states. Today, the two countries — both with troubled relations
with the United States — are Muslim middle powers with a growing entente in a
multipolar Eurasia.
In
recent years, cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey has strengthened not just
in the defense, diplomatic, and economic realms, but also in the cultural
space, causing geopolitical ripple effects in the Himalayas, the Arabian
Peninsula, and the South Caucasus.
The
emerging Pakistan-Turkey entente now has the buy-in of Pakistan’s leading
political parties and three military services, as well as the Turkish
leadership. The partnership aids and, at times, complicates the quest of both
countries for strategic autonomy as options in the West narrow. However, the
potential of the Pakistani-Turkish entente will be constrained by the economic
precarity of the two countries and the limited prospects for growth in trade in
the near term.
Brothers in arms
On Jan.
23, at a ceremony for Turkish-built naval vessels, including a corvette for the
Pakistan Navy, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke of the “great
potential” for defense industrial cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey,
which he described as “brotherly countries.”
Indeed,
as its domestic arms industry has grown rapidly, so too has the profile of
Ankara’s defense deals with Islamabad, quickly shifting from the upgrading of
Pakistani hardware originally procured from other NATO countries — American
F-16s and French Agosta 90-B subs — to the sale of arms made in
Turkey.
Turkish
arms transfers to Pakistan totaled $112 million from 2016-2019, according to
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). During this
period, Turkey was Pakistan's fourth-largest source of arms, surpassing the
United States, and Pakistan was Turkey’s third-largest arms export market,
according to SIPRI. These numbers will grow as Turkey fulfills recent orders
from Pakistan exceeding $3 billion, including the purchase of four MILGEM
Ada-class corvettes, two of which will be built in Pakistan, and 30 T-129
Atak helicopters.
Pakistani
and Turkish aspirations for defense autarky were both born from bitter
experiences of being sanctioned by the West. Continued Western compellence also
drives — and problematizes — Pakistan-Turkey defense cooperation. The
T-129 helicopter deal has been in limbo as Congress has blocked
export licenses to Turkey for its American-British designed LHTEC T800-4A
turboshaft engine. Turkey is developing a replacement for the T800-4A, the TEI
TS1400, which could salvage the deal should U.S.-Turkey relations remain cold.
But the TS1400 is currently in the prototype stage — years away from
service.
While
China will remain Pakistan’s main source of imported defense hardware, Turkey
too provides an alternative to increasingly inaccessible American and French
equipment, and modestly eases Islamabad’s dependence on Beijing. The T-129s are
intended to replace Pakistan’s aging fleet of American AH-1F Cobras.
Pakistan has also purchased Turkish armaments for its JF-17 fighter jet,
jointly manufactured with China.
Pakistan-Turkey
defense relations go beyond purchases of Turkish arms by Islamabad. Ankara has procured training
aircraft, drone parts, and bombs from Islamabad. And the two countries are
also increasingly pursuing technological cooperation. The MILGEM Ada-class ship
deal, for example, involves the transfer of technology. Turkish Aerospace
Industries (TAI) has also secured an agreement with Pakistan’s
premier engineering school, the National University of Science and Technology,
for research and development cooperation and faculty and student exchanges. TAI
has also agreed to set up shop at Pakistan’s National Science and
Technology Park, a section of which will focus on defense projects, including
cyberwarfare, drones, and radar technology.
A diplomatic bloc
Earlier
in January, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Turkey held the second round of foreign
minister-level trilateral talks in Islamabad, issuing a joint statement reflecting
alignment on the disputes in Cyprus, Kashmir, and Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan
and Pakistan have for some time sided with one another on their main
territorial disputes. And Turkey has long been a supporter of Azerbaijani
sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. But Turkey’s embrace of the Kashmiri cause
is relatively new. In recent years, Erdoğan has vocally advocated a negotiated
settlement to the Kashmir conflict, including at the U.N. General Assembly,
where he called for the dispute to be resolved “within the framework
of the U.N. resolutions” and “in line with the expectations of the people of
Kashmir.”
Erdoğan’s
language has angered New Delhi, which bristles at any outside attempt to
internationalize the Kashmir dispute. And Erdoğan has won hearts in Pakistan,
which has struggled to gain diplomatic support, including from Muslim-majority
countries, for its position on Kashmir.
Driven
in part by a desire to expand ties with New Delhi, a leading energy importer,
Abu Dhabi and Riyadh have distanced themselves from support for the Kashmiri
cause. But Pakistan, particularly after India’s effective annexation of
Kashmir in 2019, sees Kashmir as an existential issue. As a result, it has
doubled down on alignment with Turkey, even initially partnering with Iran,
Malaysia, and Turkey to hold an Islamic summit in Kuala Lumpur in December
2019. This angered Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, resulting in Islamabad backing
out of the summit. Despite Pakistan’s compliance, months later, after Erdoğan’s
state visit to Islamabad, Saudi Arabia asked Pakistan to repay short-term
loans meant to bolster its precarious foreign exchange reserves.
The
Turkish-Pakistani bloc has also ruffled feathers elsewhere. In October,
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan gave an interview with an Indian news
channel partly owned by a member of the country’s Hindu
nationalist ruling party and, without evidence, accused Pakistan of
sending mercenaries to Nagorno-Karabakh.
Pashinyan gave an
interview with an Indian news channel partly owned by a member of the
country’s Hindu nationalist ruling party and, without evidence, accused
Pakistan of sending mercenaries to Nagorno-Karabakh.
A culture of Muslim nationalism
Turkey’s
diplomatic reach into Pakistan extends into the soft power space as well. An
Urdu-language version of the series, “Diriliş: Ertuğrul,” which chronicles the
rise of the father of the founder of the Ottoman Empire, is a hit in
Pakistan.
The
Turkish state television-produced show airs in primetime on the state-run
Pakistan Television. Views of its first episode on YouTube alone
exceed 90 million and the show’s Turkish cast members are now celebrities in
Pakistan. The success of “Ertuğrul” has spurred discussions between the two
countries on the development of a new series, “Turk Lala,” profiling a man
from present-day Pakistan who migrated to Turkey in 1920 and fought in support
of the embattled Ottoman Empire.
Muslim
nationalism, both as a contemporary sentiment and a historical narrative, now
colors a relationship rooted in realpolitik.
The road ahead: Vulnerable economies
Alongside
rising arms sales, Turkish economic investment in Pakistan has grown in the
past decade. Turkish foreign direct investment in Pakistan since 2009 has
exceeded $300 million. Zorlu Energy, a Turkish company, has constructed a
series of renewable independent power projects. In 2016, Arçelik, the home
appliance subsidiary of the Turkish conglomerate Koç Holding, bought the
Pakistani company Dawlance for $258 million. Lahore’s waste management has also
been outsourced to two Turkish companies since 2012.
While
Turkish investment in Pakistan has risen, bilateral trade between the two
countries has remained stagnant over the past decade, peaking at around $1.1
billion in 2011, according to U.N. Comtrade, partly due to Ankara’s
protectionism. Talks over a free trade agreement have also stalled.
Late
last year, Turkey’s transport minister said that a rail line connecting
Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey could become operational in 2021. But policies
that inhibit trade and the abysmal state of Pakistan’s rail network will have
to be addressed for their economic connectivity aspirations to go beyond
rhetoric.
Pakistan
and Turkey have rapidly formed a strategic partnership in recent years amid a
very fluid global order. The two countries share important elements of national
power — strong militaries, strategic locations, and sizeable populations — that
will drive defense, diplomatic, and technological cooperation in the years to
come.
But the
two countries also share some vulnerabilities: their economies are in their
worst shape in two decades and both countries are net energy importers. In the
case of Pakistan, the structural economic weaknesses are far more deep: chief
among them, the dismal state of human development.
For
both Pakistan and Turkey to succeed in their respective quests for strategic
autonomy and leverage their partnership into firm geostrategic gains, sustained
economic growth is .
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